A proposal to assist in the resolution of Fiscal Lateral Violence in Aboriginal
Corporations. It is proposed that the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 be amended to provide that a substantial minority of corporation members may elect that the corporation “opt in” to external management. This article focuses on a single issue: Fiscal Lateral Violence in Aboriginal Corporations. These organisations include land-holding bodies such as state and territory land rights corporations and registered native title bodies corporate (RNTBCs) of which there are currently more than 216. Some large Indigenous corporations could be considered quasi-local governments, particularly those located in remote and regional areas. Depending on the size of the corporation, they might deliver: essential services that would usually be provided by mainstream local government, including access to basic human rights such as health, housing and medical services; a range of services that are different to those of mainstream corporations; functions associated with native title; an interface to ‘mainstream’ society; infrastructure (such as power stations) to remote Indigenous communities; and hold land for Indigenous groups or manage the group’s native title rights and interests. The Australian Human Rights Commissioner’s 2007 report (The 2007 Report) http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/native-title-report-2007-chapter-6 In 2002 there was a review of the Aboriginal Corporations and Associations Act 1976. (the ACA Act) The review found, amongst other things, that the ACA Act was failing to prevent corruption and consequently it provided inadequate protection for members of corporations; The CATSI Act was developed after independent review and consultation over two years. Further research was conducted by the Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (now ORIC). Important decisions by ORIC are not reviewable under the Act. The 2007 Report said that “A critical feature of many Indigenous corporations is that they are formed pursuant to a legislative requirement or as a result of government policy. Arguably they are not truly ‘voluntary’ corporations of individuals.” and it cited various passages from the ACA review people who would not otherwise have formed a corporation, and who may not understand the consequences or technical requirements of incorporation, are required to do so; the requirement for incorporation can force together Indigenous groups which would not otherwise have joined together, and which might not share the same views or goals, making the corporation vulnerable to destabilising competition between groups; and the requirement for the establishment of community corporations to perform community services can result in confusion between the membership of the community and the membership of the corporation itself The 2007 report went on “The ACA Act Report was critical of the ACA Act for not significantly discouraging corruption and nepotism within Indigenous corporations. There were concerns about the need to protect the rights of members of Indigenous corporations against oppression and abuse by officers of the corporation and external stakeholders” In 2010 the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC) produced a research paper on the failure of some 96 Indigenous corporations. http://www.oric.gov.au/html/publications/other/Analysing-key-characteristics-in-Indigenous-corporate%20failure_v-2-2.pdf Among the concluded reasons for failure were: · There are two groups claiming to be the legitimate Governing Committee. · The dispute has become protracted involving solicitors and the police and there is little likelihood of the dispute being resolved at a local level. · It appears that neither current Committee has a legitimate claim to manage the corporations affairs. · It is considered that acknowledgement of one Committee over the other will open the gates to legal challenges by the other Committee, the outcome of which may only be resolved in a court of law. · There has been a complete communication breakdown within the Aboriginal community that has resulted in a sense of alienation between certain members of the corporation and factions within the community. · There have been allegations of threatening and intimidating behaviour. · The chairperson currently has an apprehended violence order against a community member. The chairperson and administrator argue that the Committee acts in the broader interests of the Aboriginal community. A ‘vocal’ minority disagree suggesting it is rife with ‘nepotism, cronyism and poor governance.’ In 2011 The Commissioners Native Title Report, http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/native-title-report-2011 with some stated misgivings, opened dialogue on “lateral violence” - A range of damaging behaviours expressed by those of a minority oppressed group towards others of that group rather than towards the system of oppression - and recommended “That targeted research is undertaken to develop the evidence base and tools to address lateral violence as it relates to the native title system.” At page 95 The Commissioner said we use tactics such as bullying, fighting, gossiping and intimidation to assert authority within our native title claim group and to ensure we have access to any benefits that flow from membership in the claim group. The 2012 Native Title report http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/native-title-report-2012 referred back to the 2011 recommendations: and asserted that “The Government has failed to implement these recommendations.” The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) and the National Native Title Council (NNTC) have developed the Indigenous Community Development Corporation (ICDC) as a model for managing native title and other payments negotiated by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/native-title-report-2012 Ultimately it provides for an external measure of equitable management. It is said that: The objective of the ICDC is to accept and distribute payments on a tax-free basis so as to: maximise the economic and social benefits for current and future generations of native title groups reduce administration for native title groups that have minimal governance capacity improve governance arrangements. The ICDC is a single entity that will facilitate funds accumulation, economic development, environment and land management, housing, education and learning, culture and community development ... Native title groups will be able to either choose to ‘opt in to have their mining and/or other agreement payments managed’ under the ICDC or ‘continue with current practices’... In the 2007 report The Commissioner had already said that: PBCs (Prescribed Bodies Corporate) and RNTBCs (Registered Native Title Bodies Corporate) are governed by a complex legislative framework that sets out functions and responsibilities for RNTBCs through the Native Title Act and the Native Title (Prescribed Bodies Corporate) Regulations. While the CATSI Act aims to remove conflicts and uncertainty about how the two Acts operate together, the corporation may also have added responsibilities. The responsibilities may be under other Commonwealth, state or territory legislation. They are often expected to address broader community social and cultural issues that exceed legislative requirements and responsibilities. A prescribed body corporate must be registered under the CATSI Act. Additionally, they are regulated by a number of other complex and sometimes conflicting sources of law, including: the law of trusts and agency; · the Federal Court’s determination of native title; and aspects of traditional law and custom recognised by the Federal Court. This legislative framework is also supported by an array of administrative arrangements that involve: The Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs; The Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations; · Native title representative bodies; State and local governments where Indigenous land use agreements and other native title agreements have been negotiated; and The private sector supporting the operations of registered native title bodies corporate. ...needs to be a process whereby members of PBCs can properly hold PBCs to account for breaches of the NTA [Native Title Act] and PBC Regulations. At the moment, if a PBC does not comply with its obligations, the only remedy is for members to take legal action against the PBC. This course of action is often outside the capacity and resources of affected members. The result is that native title rights and interests can be severely impacted upon and affected through the actions of a PBC without the mandate of the common law [native title] holders and the common law [native title] holders have little or no recourse to easily accessible legal advice or other relevant assistance. Much of the Commissioners reports concerning the objectives of sovereignty and self determination are omitted in this article which is focussed on a single issue in the melange of complexities brought about by the mixture of indigenous and non-indigenous law and cultural customs. If these are premises that can be drawn from the discussion: Common to all humanity Aboriginal Communities and Aboriginal People are not homogenous and one size does not fit all Communities have been subjected to statutory impositions to amalgamate in ways they may not otherwise have chosen in order to manage native title rights and benefits. There are many failures and breakdowns of Aboriginal Corporations and some of these breakdowns are due to lateral violence – physical and fiscal. These breakdowns are identified by factionalism which prevents self management. Access to legal remedies is very difficult if not impossible. ORIC frequently gets called in too late. Then why not introduce a further option for corporation management? The ICDC is an “opt in” model. But it needs a majority resolution by the corporation. How will those in temporary or permanent power of the corporation ever be persuaded to “opt in” to the ICDC model if it means giving up control? This is a perennial human problem resolved in the Australian Constitution by a balance of powers. Total autonomy and self determination are sometimes asserted as a sort of indigenous Holy Grail yet such autonomy in any community, indigenous or otherwise, is rare. Aboriginal Corporations (by their breakdown record) seem to demonstrate inadequate internal balances of power and the external power circuit breaker of legal action seem out of reach. If it is broke – then fix it. An amendment to the CATSI act could provide that a substantial minority group is able to elect that the corporation “opt in” to the ICDC management model. That would have at least two affects; firstly it would provide an internal balance of power by giving some incentive to the management of the corporation to satisfy the substantial minority and secondly it would provide an equitable alternative if it did not. It would only need a stroke of the pen to provide that a special resolution of say 40%, perhaps 30% or 20% would compel the ORIC to impose the IDCC model. Diagram of the ICDC model as cited in the Commissioners 2012 report (and would be here if I knew how to do it) The author, John Bolton, has practised in the Native Title Jurisdiction, acting for State, Native Title and other parties. He is currently semi-retired. HOLDEN AUSTRALIA
Australian’s buy cars, lots of them. 95,000 per month. Australian’s own and buy cars in sufficient numbers to support an Australian motor vehicle manufacturing industry so why do manufacturers of cars in Australia continue to fail when other countries car industries seem to do well. One way of looking at it is to say that GMH will only stay until they ultimately fail, larger and more frequent subsidies will be demanded as GM-USA structures itself to survive internationally by making use of their multi-national resources. At some point it will become too costly and government will say no. The Australian Government needs to give GMH an exit strategy. Another is to say The Australian Government has no car plan. It has been unable or unwilling to develop a plan for Australia which will see an Australian car manufacturer competing. It has been unable to keep up with all of the contemporary pressures on such a global industry and what it has failed to do, the car industry must do for itself. The tax re-distribution to GMH in order to keeps its doors open is a reasonable price. At some point it will become too costly and government will say no. The Australian Government needs to give GMH an exit strategy. Whichever way it is looked at things need to change. There needs to be a plan that looks further than the next election. Australia can manufacture things. It leads in areas of intellectual, technological production and innovation. What if those skills were turned to car manufacturing? Australia can make cars, it seems to have difficulty competing economically. Toyota in Victoria provide a product that people want, and buy. Why does Holden, the American General Motors branch in Australia, not? They just don’t meet the market? They must be making what people don’t want. They just produce a car as part of their American system and tell the market that’s it? The Australian Car needs to connect with purchasers, workers need to connect with the product. A sense of pride needs restoring in the product makers and the product purchasers. GM will continue to keep holding their hands out and to conduct their Australian business with reliance on subsidy. Or to be less emotive, Tax breaks and redistribution to take into account their disadvantage of working in the Australian political environment which has no plan to otherwise ensure their longevity. Their position is that subsidy/tax distribution from the government is an essential part of contemporary vehicle manufacturing. They assert that this is the way the car business runs. It is part of their bottom line. When they look at options of what to do in Australia they look to see if there is an overlap with what they do elsewhere and cheaper for GM and balance that against the subsidy/breaks sought here. Why produce their Opel in Australia when it can be done by another subsidiary cheaper? The more expensive, less efficient parts of their business can be done with government breaks and subsidies in Australia. They are not permitting the Australian Holden to compete internationally. The middle east market is serviced by Opel. That is GM Germany, not GM Australia. In Australia smaller, boutique motor vehicles with high quality, such as BMW and Volvo are seen as a cut above Holden. Toyota is seen as more reliable. Yet so many of the same component parts are used in these vehicles. They are just assembled differently. There are only two producers of window winders in the world. GMH uses the one made in France. With so many internationalized car components why do some manufacturers put them together in a way that is seen as high quality and reliable but GMH does not? The American’s who come to enjoy their time in Australia and preside over GM here for a while have not got their priorities for Holden high enough up the list. Such laissez- faire attitudes to priorities and competitiveness with reliance on government subsidy to even function has flowed to the shop floor. Holden workers, “have a go”, but they are not particularly fussy. Why is it important to make it so well? If there is to be a “Holden Australia”, it needs great leadership that can look after its workers’ interests, motivate them to be the best every day, and look after Australia’s interests in a competitive world. It happened in Chrysler when it was resurrected and rebuilt by just such a great leader.. Great leadership is what is needed. Ownership needs to change. Staff needs to know – “This is now Australian” . “Holden will be the best car ever produced.” Sales need to be cemented. Don’t change Holden. Get rid of GM, is one option. After all an Australian, “The Mr.Holden” started the whole thing. “Holden and Frost” of Adelaide. Cement sales first then gain market share and export as Australian Holdens. Australian Holden’s could compete, not being held back as part of the GM America strategy. What if Australian intellectual capacity and innovation in technology was brought to bear on creating an Australian vehicle that is what people want. It could be a world beater. It has been done in other countries, including European countries with high wages. BMW, Volvo. Why not in Australia. Instead of being burdened by what is dictated from America, in what is to them a backwater, Australian’s could do what they can still sometimes do best. New ideas, new technology, new methods and new ways of doing things. This intellectual property would belong to Australia. With more Australian product innovation, international sources could still be drawn on to supplement the Australian Industry but instead of being dictated to by GMH as to what fits in to their American internationalized system and having to fit to their imposed design and imported tooling the whole world’s best practice becomes an option for Australia’s Holden. The factory and rolling stock that could be Holden Australia is already here, being maintained by Australian Government subsidy. If it stops rolling that will be the end of it. If Australia wants to have a Holden it cannot afford to let GMH shut the plant down and denude the resource because it could never afford to start from greenfields. Mitsubishi left a scorched earth factory for that very reason. One way would be to achieve an Australian shareholding in GM. GM may well see a share purchase by Australia as of benefit to them. It is a vote of confidence and assured support. More secure for them than persistent application to changing governments for ongoing, but uncertain support packages. No more subsidy without shares for Australia. Australia needs the controlling share. Sooner rather than too late. Taxpayers are supporting GM. Taxpayers should own it. What about a public company. The subsidy should create that and take GMH shares. Australian’s could buy shares in the company, Make it Australian. Australian Holden workers could be given great leadership and once again take pride. GMH will only stay until they ultimately fail, larger and more frequent subsidies will be demanded as GM USA structure themselves to survive internationally and make use of their international resources. GM Holden is only maintained by them for the low subsidized end of their regime. At some point it will be too hard and too costly to subsidize and government will say no. GMH will then clean out the tools and machinery, take their bat and ball and go home. It will be too late. The Australian Government needs to give GMH a succession strategy, perhaps an exit strategy. Let’s strike a deal for succession now. Make the next subsidy a down payment. |
jOHNWBOLTONWriter and Commentator. Archives
September 2022
Categories
All
|